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ABSTRACT: Studies of the relationship between the EU and NATO often focus on 
the limitations of cooperation, be it at the political or operational levels. However, 
little is known about the functioning of the political institutional linkages between 
the EU and NATO. This article therefore studies the main decision-making bodies of 
the two organisations at the political, ambassadorial level, namely the Political 
Security Committee (PSC) of the EU and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in 
NATO, as well as their joint meetings. The article employs an inductive Grounded 
Theory approach, drawing on open-ended interviews with PSC and NAC 
ambassadors, which reveal direct insights from the objects of analysis. The findings 
emphasise the impact of both structural and more agency-related categories on 
decision-making in these three fora. The article thus addresses both the paucity of 
study on these bodies more broadly and the complete lacuna on joint PSC-NAC 
meetings specifically, warranting the inductive approach this article endorses. 
Keywords: European Union; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; decision-
making; international security organisations; grounded theory; 
Introduction 
Much has been written about the political and strategic blockages limiting the EU and 
NATO cooperation more generally. However, the two organisations are interwoven 
politically and historically, not least through the extent to which memberships overlap.1 
Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that the institutional linkages between the two 
organisations at the political and strategic level are under researched. Joint consultations 
between the EU and NATO at this level are particularly neglected in the literature, which is 
why a closer investigation into the key bodies facilitating any political institutional 
linkages is justified. Institutional linkages between the EU and NATO currently exist at the 
level of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU and the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) of NATO in the form of joint meetings.  
 	
As principal decision-making bodies within NATO and the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) respectively, one would expect that the NAC and the PSC also 
play a central role in the shaping and direction of the relationship between the two 
organisations.2 Despite their obvious centrality within each organisation and for the 
relationship between them, no scholarship has thus far engaged in the combined study of 
the NAC and the PSC, or attempted to look more closely at their similarities and 
differences.3 This makes for a gap in the literature that this article seeks to fill. Arguably, 
understanding how decisions are made in each forum can shed light on the organisational 
conditions of cooperation and help contextualise the political deadlock that has 
characterised the relationship between the EU and NATO over the last decades, in 
particular the puzzling nature of the joint PSC-NAC meetings. This is especially salient at 
a time when the Strategic Partnership between NATO and the EU is under renewed 
pressure to offer a more workable and responsive modus operandi.  
The NAC and the PSC share a number of features that make a comparison both 
analytically viable and relevant. In terms of rules of procedure, both the NAC and the PSC 
are set up as intergovernmental bodies that operate according to the principle of 
consensus.4 They both deal with the issue areas of security and defence and de facto take 
on a key role in shaping the policies of their respective organisations. To some, therefore, 
the two bodies constitute each other’s counterparts in two organisations that differ in 
nature and functioning but converge in the way they approach and govern matters of 
security and defence, which is, intergovernmentally, with each member state retaining a 
veto (or constructive abstention) and consensual decision-making in place.. Most 
importantly, however, any formal meetings between the EU and NATO are held at the 
level of the NAC and the PSC, making the relationship between these two particular bodies 
one of the focal points of the oft-cited political deadlock between the two organisations. 
 	
Given the dearth of literature on this inter-organisational relationship, work that 
develops and adopts particular conceptualisations or theoretical explanations for it has also 
been relatively limited. Anecdotal evidence from the personal environment of the EU’s 
first High Representative (at the time, double-hatted as Secretary General of the Council of 
the EU), Javier Solana, has suggested that the PSC was originally modelled on its more 
dated NATO counterpart, which may indeed explain some of the parallels between them: 
Solana had formerly served as Secretary General of NATO, so when ESDP/CSDP 
structures had to be set up within a short time frame, there has likely been plenty of 
incentive for him to draw on the modus operandi and organisational culture he had worked 
in previously. Therefore, together, the NAC and the PSC, including the advisory bodies 
around them, indeed produce a seemingly neat case of institutional isomorphism 
(‘copying’) or mimesis (imitation of an established model) (Reynolds 2010; Juncos 2007) 
where the design of one, the PSC, was clearly informed by previous experiences with a 
similar structure, the NAC.  
Some advanced a historical institutionalist approach to capture the dynamic 
between the PSC and the NAC, placing more emphasis on the structural factors but 
essentially also pointing at the way in which the institutional design of one had influenced 
the other (e.g. Reynolds 2010). Others have highlighted the role of epistemic communities 
in shaping the institutional environment of each the NAC and the PSC and the two in 
comparison with each other (e.g. Cross 2011). A broader body of literature has dealt with 
the NAC and/or PSC from a socialisation perspective, focusing on social interactions as a 
constituting factor of particular forms of security governance (Juncos and Reynolds 2007, 
Juncos and Pomorska 2011). One of the broader findings of this work is that the NAC and 
PSC, while similar in setup and structure, have developed different political logics.  
 	
Howorth (2012) noted that the PSC had developed some form of supranational 
strategic culture that would transcend the intergovernmental dynamics coming from the 
member states – what he called “supranational intergovernmentalism”. Puetter (2014) 
advanced a similar argument and proposed that the PSC was an example of “deliberative 
intergovernmentalism” because of its particular way of decision-making. Bickerton (2011) 
also stated that the intergovernmentalism in the PSC was of a “peculiar type” given that its 
function was “not simply to maintain national vetoes” but to act as a “consensus-
generating machine”. This would effectively make the PSC differ from the NAC, where 
the latter is (relatively understudied but) predominantly still perceived as 
intergovernmentalist in the traditional sense; arguably, it is consensus-oriented but at the 
same time also a venue for hard inter-state bargaining.  
This article speaks to these theoretical propositions and findings while at the same 
time departing from the deductive approach that tends to dominate this literature (and 
much of the literature on security institutions in general), i.e. an approach that rationalises 
empirical observations based on specific theoretical premises. We adopt a somewhat 
unorthodox methodology in that we derive generalisable findings from empirical 
observations instead of applying a particular testable theoretical approach to make sense of 
data. We propose a framework based on Grounded Theory (GT) with the aim to develop 
the research agenda on the EU-NATO relationship further, and to investigate some of the 
mainstream claims about the NAC and the PSC more specifically. Thus, we advance an 
inductive approach to analyse the two bodies, each for themselves and in their relationship 
with each other. We expect this to reveal idiosyncrasies that can bear fruit for further 
theorisation and analysis and, as such, inform the development of a research agenda 
concerning the comparative study of the NAC and the PSC. The article complements the 
 	
contributions of Koops (2017) and Græger (2017) in this special issue in the way it extends 
the theoretical discussion through dense empiricism.  
The following section addresses the question of the comparability of the NAC and 
the PSC, and outlines GT as a methodological framework that can be meaningfully applied 
to the study of the NAC and the PSC. We proceed with a discussion of the material 
gathered in two rounds of interviews, from which – in line with the GT approach further 
outlined below – three main “conceptual categories” emerged: (1) “established 
procedures”, (2) “driving consensus” and (3) “the rhythm of work.”5 The conclusion of the 
article then summarises the possible linkages between these categories and offers insights 
into the workings of the PSC, the NAC and their joint meetings. After a reflection on the 
usefulness of the GT approach, the article situates the findings into a broader perspective 
of EU-NATO cooperation. 
Analysing the NAC and PSC in a Grounded Theory framework 
To develop a framework for the comparison we propose, we first outline more specifically 
where the NAC and the PSC differ , not least to not least to problematise and illustrate 
their comparability. One key difference lies in the institutional context and hierarchy that 
they each find themselves in. The NAC consists of all the permanent representations of the 
NATO members6 and can be convened at the level of heads of state, foreign ministers, 
defence ministers or, more regularly, at ambassadorial level of permanent representatives. 
No matter at what rank it meets, all decisions of the NAC have the same level of authority 
(Medcalf 2006, p. 34). It is the only decision making body that is referred to in the North 
Atlantic Treaty and does therefore not have any superseding decision-making body within 
the organisation that it needs to take into account.  
The PSC was established by the Treaty of Nice (article 25) and an EU Council 
Decision of 22 January 2001 (The Council of the European Union 2001),7 originally, as a 
 	
decision-making body that considers all aspects of the CFSP. In practice, however, it has 
tended to spend ‘most of its time on CSDP matters’ (Howorth 2012, p. 6). It is made up of 
ambassadors that represent the member states of the EU.8 The Permanent Representatives 
of the EU Member States, usually more senior ambassadors, sit in the COREPER, which, 
along with the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and the European Council, formally 
outranks the PSC. Since the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the PSC has been chaired by an official 
from the European External Action Service (EEAS), giving the supranational institutions 
influence with regard to agenda-setting.9  
This difference in authority between the NAC and the PSC could be construed as a 
reason not to view them as each other’s counterparts. Arguably, however, as will be 
demonstrated further below, the PSC is still more comparable to the NAC than the 
COREPER, not least in terms of its remit, and its particular focus on security and defence. 
It has developed a reputation as the “linchpin” (Duke, 2005) and “working horse” of the 
CSDP (Meyer 2006, p. 116) “that really runs foreign policy” (interview cited in Puetter 
2014, p. 196), effectively making it the institutional equivalent of NAC within the EU. 
That said, the strongest argument in favour of a comparison is that formal meetings 
between the EU and NATO involve exactly these two bodies. 
As Koops (2017) illustrates in his contribution to this special issue, researchers of 
international security organisations have been able to draw on a variety of theoretical 
approaches including most notably, the dominant foundationalist theories, Realism and 
Liberalism, and more recently, post-foundationalist theories like Sociological 
Institutionalism and Social Constructivism more generally. Each approach prioritises 
certain concepts over others and thereby almost naturally excludes some aspects of a 
problem to enable focus on another. The resulting parsimony and analytical focus are of 
course key currencies in social science; they are “seen as a measurement of the maturity of 
 	
a research area or the ‘normalisation’ of otherwise dispersed research efforts” (Lynggaard, 
Löfgren and Manners 2015, p. 8).  
For some time now, deductive reasoning has been the gold standard in mainstream 
scholarly work. However, in line with the epistemological literature on theorisation and 
inductive causal discovery (see Blagden 2016 for a recent overview), we point to an 
obvious limitation of the deductive research process: as the interested scholar is given a 
range of options to make ex ante choices about their analytical focus and line of reasoning 
they are free to model their approach around convenience (access to data/the organisation 
in question, capacity to undertake field work, time frame, personal preference) and fit to 
the perceived issue or puzzle (confirmation bias). As a result, this theory-driven kind of 
scholarly work is potentially self-referential and truth-preserving, and therefore, biased 
towards the explanation it sought to prove.  
This kind of dynamic can be relatively limiting when a research area is not yet 
readily developed (see also Aggestam 2004). What is more, the nature of studying security 
organisations also conditions the research design: the confidentiality of primary data and 
the general volatility of the international security environment (for discussions on the latter 
in this special issue, please see Duke & Gebhard 2017) make a foundationalist ontology 
and positivist epistemology, which rely on ex ante assumptions and “facts” (in Social 
Constructivism, as naturalised by social agents; Pouliot 2010, p. 58), difficult to follow and 
realise. 
That all being said, we are not proposing a general dismissal of deductive research 
or of the general ambition in the field to produce cumulative knowledge that way. Our 
overall message is a more pragmatic one: as research on the NAC-PSC relationship is still 
in its infancy, and studies on the NAC in particular are few and far between, a direct, 
inductive and case-oriented approach can yield more comprehensive insights for this 
 	
burgeoning research agenda than an overly studious deductive approach that invites 
somewhat of a feedback loop between theoretical premises and empirical evidence.  
Apart from our case-specific interest, we would like to reinforce Blagden’s (2016, 
p. 195) proposition “that it is only once we accept that induction is an intrinsic and 
unavoidable component of IR theory building that we can truly seek answers to the most 
important questions of international politics” and that “IR scholars should strive to use the 
two in tandem as they set about developing new theory.”10 
We employ GT to provide a framework for our analysis, in part to counter common 
criticisms of inductive reasoning as lacking focus (data is relevant to start with) and being 
biased towards the researcher’s existing knowledge (Stadler 2004). Although a ‘theory’ in 
terms, GT is a methodology that specifically aims to render an inductive approach more 
scientific and methodical (Glaser and Strauss 1967); it has as such found wide application 
across the social sciences including in the study of intergovernmental organisations (see 
e.g. Howell 2000, Panetta 2013, Peters 2015; Richards and Farrokhnia 2016). It provides 
an analytical road map for generating explanatory theories that are quite literally 
‘grounded’ in empirical data about social processes, gathered in most cases, through 
interviews, participant observation or ethnographies.11  
The process of data collection is seen to bring about repeated arguments and ideas 
that are tagged with codes, which are grouped into concepts, and then into categories and 
sub-categories, as more data is collected and reviewed. These categories and sub-
categories then serve as points of reference for further empirical exploration, and 
ultimately, preliminary inference of generalised conclusions. GT prescribes a “constant 
comparative analysis” of the data and simultaneous and continuous collection and analysis 
of data. Data collection (or in GT terms, theoretical sampling) is “controlled by the 
emerging theory” (Glaser and Strauss, p. 45, original emphasis), which then guides 
 	
towards further refinement through “research questions suggested by previous answers” (p. 
47).12 In short, the main methodological proposition is to identify different levels of 
regularities and patterns in the data, and generate codes, concepts and categories on that 
basis.13 It encourages constant reflexivity and transparency of the theory generation 
process in the form of memos, which also formed part of the research documentation for 
this article. The output can come in the form of “well-codified set of propositions or in a 
running theoretical discussion, using conceptual categories and their properties” (p. 31), 
the latter being the ambition in this study. 
In accordance with GT, data was collected in more than one round of interviews, 
with each round informing the next one in terms of empirical focus and scope.14 Our 
interlocutors were all ambassador-level representatives (or deputies) of each the NAC and 
the PSC.15 The first round of interviews started with general open-ended questions about 
decision-making within each organisation and how, in the view of each interlocutor, this 
would compare to the other organisation. Questions relating to the inter-organisational 
relationship were included as appropriate in the context of each interview (or as raised by 
the interviewees themselves).  
This is to note that all points of comparison and coding in this study were inspired 
by the practitioners themselves; rather than merely serving as objects of study, they were 
active contributors to the research process. Their positions, perceptions and preferences 
influenced the course of our data collection without any ex ante analytical shaping or 
hypothesising from our part. Through careful coding of the transcripts and direct guidance 
from the interlocutors, the data laid bare three key themes that interlocutors repeatedly 
homed in on, both in reflection of their own organisation and in their counterpart. These 
constitute the key ‘conceptual categories’ developed at this analytical instance: (1) 
“established procedures”, (2) “driving consensus” and (3) “the rhythm of work”.16 The 
 	
following analytical sections present our data in a running theoretical discussion according 
to these categories. We present these as preliminary findings that invite further refinement. 
More empirical exploration will be necessary to reach – in GT terms – theoretical 
‘saturation’ (Bowen 2008). 
Synopsis of empirical findings 
“Established procedures”17 
One cluster of themes raised by our interlocutors included iterations about the frequency of 
meetings, the preparation of the agenda and the consensus rule. We categorised this 
cluster as ‘established procedures’ and took the emerging sub-categories as a point of 
reference for a comparison between the NAC and the PSC, before turning to a detailed 
account of the joint NAC-PSC meetings along similar lines. 
The PSC and the NAC in comparison 
One sub-category that emerged from the data was the frequency of meetings and the way it 
indicates comparative levels of activity. The NAC meets most often at the ambassador 
level, usually at least once a week. However, as the ambassadors and their delegations are 
situated within the NATO HQ in Brussels, the body can meet more often and at short 
notice, for informal meetings (Interview 3, 2012). The NAC also convenes at the 
ministerial level on average four times a year, and at the level of heads of state when 
urgency requires; however, more often than not, this only happens when a major summit 
takes place. Formal Council days are Wednesdays, with Thursdays normally reserved for 
meetings with NATO Partners.  
The PSC is a body that meets regularly if not “all the time” (Interview 2, 2012). The 
PSC meets increasingly more often than the NAC having at least two formal meetings per 
week,18 usually on Tuesdays and Thursdays. In the week before a Foreign Affairs Council, 
 	
they may also meet formally on a Friday and even, occasionally, on a Sunday. These 
meetings tend to last all day “until 6pm”, usually including a working lunch when invited 
guests visit the PSC (ibid, 2012). Compared to the frequency of the ministerial meetings at 
both the EU and NATO that are months apart, weekly meetings at ambassadorial level 
somewhat blur the lines between formality and informality, which, in addition to tighter 
deadlines and intensified interaction, shapes the preparation of the agenda. 
Before any formal meeting at both organisations, the agenda is prepared in both formal 
and informal consultations.19 In NATO, the Council Secretariat is the principal organiser of 
the NAC meetings. The agenda is a “working plan” that is updated weekly and driven 
substantially by the (at least) four ministerial (Foreign and Defence Ministers) meetings 
per year (Interview 13, 2016). The NAC meetings are permanently chaired by the 
Secretary General or the Deputy Sec/Gen. The formal NAC agenda therefore tends to be 
much more driven by the Sec/Gen (and various allies lobbying behind the scenes) than the 
agendas for informal meetings, which are more directly driven by the ambassadors.  
The NAC and the issues on the agenda are supported and prepared by the various 
committees that the Council has created over the years. Before anything goes to 
ambassadors, issues are discussed at committee level. If agreement cannot be reached or a 
higher degree of political consensus is required, it is then passed on to the NAC 
ambassadors (Interview 13, 2016).  
In the PSC, an indicative agenda is created and circulated by a dedicated PSC team 
within the EEAS, at the end of each month for the subsequent month. This calendar agenda 
is subject to change and is usually in a bullet point format. A more formal agenda is sent 
out on a Friday for the following Tuesday. This gives PSC ambassadors the time they need 
to assess whether a given agenda will be “challenging” or whether they will need to make 
an ‘intervention’ on a certain issue (Interview 17, 2016). This would then also be discussed 
 	
with the relevant teams in the capitals. The time between the Tuesday and Thursday PSC 
meetings is tighter, but ambassadors usually have an understanding of the Thursday agenda 
by the previous Monday. The Nicolaidis Group convene on the days previous to PSC 
meetings in order to further prepare the agenda for the PSC meetings. The capitals will also 
use this draft agenda to inform the speaking points for the ambassadors at these meetings.  
Besides the draft agenda, the EEAS also sends both the Member States and the 
Nicolaidis Group draft “internal” PSC conclusions (Interview 17, 2016), which contain a 
note on each of the formal agenda items with an indication of the EEAS’s desired outcome 
after discussions. According to one PSC interlocutor, the intended benefit of this process is 
that there will be no “surprises” and that PSC meetings run more smoothly (Interview 12, 
2016).  
The sub-categories above are preconditions for the written and unwritten rule of 
decision-making at the PSC and the NAC – the consensus rule. Formal decision-making 
follows the logic of consensus, meaning that no actual votes are taken, but decisions are 
instead deemed approved if there are no further interventions by any of the ambassadors. 
This is an “established procedure” and a firm part of the decision-making process; while 
any tangible or proposed changes to these formal rules of decision-making were of key 
interest to the researchers, discussions with NAC ambassadors suggested that any “creative 
thinking” on the formal decision-making procedures was somewhat “cyclical”, with ideas 
re-emerging very occasionally, usually, when Allies feel the acute need for more 
flexibility, e.g. in the case of a particular issue being blocked (Interview 7, 13: 2016).  
However, a central argument in the interviews was that this would probably never 
happen with some even suggesting that any changes to the consensus rule would mean “the 
end of the Alliance” (Interview 13, 2016). Even proposals to eliminate consensus at some 
of the lower level committee stages are deemed unworkable. Eventually, the Ally in 
 	
question normally reconsiders and reverts to the established procedures, out of an 
understanding that this formal process benefits the Alliance more generally (ibid). 
Since the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, a possibility exists in the PSC for qualified-
majority voting (QMV) on procedural issues. However, as no case of QMV voting could 
be confirmed; unanimity and consensus remain the preferred rule of decision-making. The 
reserve of trust is still an “absolute precondition for getting anywhere in the PSC” 
(Interview 8, 2016). Even with permanent structured cooperation (PESCO, Article 46 
TEU), a shift to QMV seems unlikely, certainly in the short term. The common position of 
those ambassadors questioned was that there is still “a real reluctance to go down the route 
of QMV in CSDP and external relations” (Interview 9, 2016).  One interlocutor suggested 
that in the current political climate, there is a risk that Member States that would not vote 
for a particular agreement in a potential QMV situation could walk away from agreed 
positions, as they may feel “less bound by that decision” (ibid).  
Given that the consensus rule appears to be sacrosanct, both organisations developed 
the formal and informal procedures described above to assure decisions can be reached in 
practice. Interestingly, as we will illustrate next, although the consultation procedures in 
PSC-NAC meetings are similar, no formal or actionable decisions are usually reached (due 
to the current agreed framework). 
PSC-NAC meetings 
Concerning the frequency of these joint meetings, a “loose formula” exists whereby two 
informal meetings for every one formal (Berlin Pus)20 meeting is the goal. The meetings 
rotate between the Justus Lipsius building (Council of the EU) and the NATO HQ. 
Working groups also meet informally before these NAC-PSC meetings. Consequently, 
they are important as an event but the experience itself is, at least from the point of view of 
some of the ambassadors involved, “dull”, “highly scripted” and “uninspiring” (Interview 
 	
7, 12, 13: 2016). Given the well-known political blockages that stymy EU-NATO writ 
large, it should be noted that both Turkey and Cyprus do have representatives in attendance 
at the informal PSC-NAC meetings.  
Some interlocutors articulated that all NAC-PSC meetings are “equally dull” 
(Interviews 1, 7, 9, 21: 2016). The majority of member states intervene (but not always) 
although they tend to read from prepared scripts. The common EU and NATO member 
states and those with Partnership for Peace (PfP) representatives will usually have two 
presenters. In such cases, there would be “no contradictions” between the two speakers, 
just internal agreements on how to split the work for a particular meeting regarding EU-
applicable aspects or NATO-oriented aspects, respectively. After a tour-de-table, the chair 
sums up the presentations “to make it look like there was some outcome” (Interview 9, 
2016). The Berlin Plus arrangements are still used for the CSDP operation ALTHEA, but 
most interlocutors suggested these meetings are not very significant either (Interviews 7, 9, 
12 13: 2016).  
The agenda is prepared two or three months in advance, by the EEAS and the 
NATO Secretariat respectively, and thus, not by the member states. Most interlocutors also 
suggested that it was the most complicated aspect of these meetings. The discussions are 
topical and relevant, so can be interesting in that regard, but what is missing are formal and 
operational NAC-PSC agreed conclusions, decisions on ALTHEA not withstanding. 
“Some” member states would like to have the EU-NATO Declaration,21 for example, 
discussed at a formal meeting and then to have the NAC-PSC jointly review progress. 
However, our data suggested that this was not currently tenable (Interview 12, 2016).  
Moreover, even if the participation problem regarding Turkey and Cyprus were to 
be alleviated “closer institutional and decision-making cooperation would not happen” 
(Interviews 9, 12, 13: 2016). There was a sentiment that “other problems” would arise and 
 	
that the two bodies would not take decisions together as they would not be “applicable” or 
would need to be “executed differently” (Interview 10, 2016). Beyond the obvious political 
blockages, the NAC and PSC would never be likely to take joint decisions because there 
are no formal “rules of procedure” or the “authority” to take decisions in that format 
(Interview 8, 2016).  
As one interlocutor explains, the only real possibility would be “for the NAC to 
take a decision first”, and the PSC a corresponding supportive decision the next day (or 
vice versa). The current system of “talking to each other” through occasional informal 
meetings, NATO summits or EU Councils is “clumsy” (Interview 12, 2016). For example, 
the Bratislava Declaration (European Council 2016) notes that the EU should “start 
implementing the joint declaration with NATO immediately” (p. 5). While it took the EU 
till September to even consider implementing the “joint declaration” signed on 8 July 2016, 
NATO civilian and military staff planners already started to generate ideas on how to 
implement the declaration on 9 July, which indicates that the sense of immediacy differs 
between the two bodies (Interview 12, 2016). 
As these findings have shown, while there is no formal decision-making between 
the NAC and the PSC (in the current agreed framework) and, therefore, no real consensus 
is needed, the established consultation and agenda setting procedures still apply to the 
common meetings, both at the institutional level (coordination between the EEAS and the 
NATO General Secretariat) and the member state level (coordination between the common 
EU and NATO/PfP members). “The objective of NAC-PSC meetings is just to have them” 
(Interview 9, 2016), and the consultations are not “crisis driven but process driven” (ibid). 
The same interlocutor went as far as to say that when it comes to NAC-PSC meetings, 
“anyone who tells you that they are very useful is not telling the truth” (Interview 9, 2016). 
They could thus essentially be looked at as an attempt to convey that there is cooperation, 
 	
and that meetings can occur without controversy with regard to the non-common member 
states (in particular, Cyprus and Turkey). A smooth public record is created for this 
particular meeting formation, one that in practice, however, does not change anything 
substantive in the relationship between the two organisations.  
 
“Driving consensus”22 
A second cluster of issues emerged from iterations about organisational design, 23 
informality24 and socialising,25 which we took to constitute sub-categories of a wider 
category of “driving consensus”. In line with the previous section on “established 
procedures”, the following discussion develops a comparison between the NAC and the 
PSC alongside these sub-categories before turning to a discussion of related perspectives 
on the joint NAC-PSC format. 
The PSC and the NAC in comparison 
While both the PSC and the NAC may differ on procedural matters, both seemingly share a 
similar consensus-seeking organisational design. The respective ministerial meetings in 
both organisations are the important “driver” that forces each decision-making body to find 
agreement (Interview 5, 2016).  No ambassador likes to “expose themselves to be 
preventing a committee from getting an agreement or consensus” on important issues that 
may be brought before ministers (ibid).  That is an important “enforcing element”, even 
more so for a NATO Summit or a European Council (ibid).  
Interviewees pointed to a logic of “if you accept my position, I will accept yours” 
(Interview 1, 2012), which, on our part, spurred further investigations into procedural 
issues. On Tuesday mornings, NAC ambassadors “regularly” meet informally in a 
“reduced format” with just a very small number of collaborators, normally 28 ambassadors 
plus one or two support personnel (Interview 3, 2012). In this format, they discuss in-depth 
 	
some of the difficult issues in an attempt to clarify any differences that exist among the 
Allies before the official NAC meeting on the Wednesday.26 
These informal lunches, hosted by individual ambassadors, are seemingly 
fundamental to the informal decision-making process. The general practice is that each 
ambassador will host a couple of two-hour lunches per year, either at their residence or on 
site at NATO HQ (Interview 13, 2016). These events are informal discussions, usually 
focused on a single issue, without note takers or any decision sheets. The agenda is shaped 
by the hosting ambassador but is quite obviously also influenced by international 
developments (ibid.).  
The data suggested two common trains of thought on the informal consultation 
process within the NAC. The first can be conceptualised as “decision-driven” as it urges 
swift agreements whenever possible (Interview 13, 2016). However, this often neglects to 
fully consider that decisions, once taken, must also be implemented. The second way of 
looking at these consultation processes is more “process driven”; the consultation process, 
even when protracted, is assumed to ultimately lead to resilient consensual decisions that 
“stand the test of time” (ibid).  
PSC ambassadors believe that the committee is designed to reach consensus. 
Another argument is that it is instinctual for the majority of colleagues to seek broad 
agreement due to frequent socialising. Beyond that, the capitals actually expect the PSC to 
“sort issues out” before matters reach the ministerial level where the politics “can get 
difficult” (Interview 9, 2016). That said, informal negotiations will often be stopped by 
ambassadors if they feel the formal setting of the PSC will provide its “own dynamics” or 
room for the “unexpected” to help shape decision-making; for example, unexpected 
support from a fellow member state (Interview 8, 2016). 
 	
Interestingly however, between the first and second rounds of data collection, one 
topic did stand out as particularly discordant within the PSC: migration. Multiple 
ambassadors intimated that the issue of migration had fractured unity within the EU and 
for some, the room for ambassadorial manoeuvre had been reduced. Furthermore, this 
“new dynamic” is said to have also worked its way up to the FAC which, in turn, ties the 
hands of the EEAS because, on some issues, FAC ministers have sent instructions that they 
prefer no ‘official’ agreement in the PSC if their interests are not met (Interview 8, 9, 12: 
2016). 
PSC-NAC meetings 
As our data above shows, both the PSC and NAC ambassadors convene frequently to 
consult both formally and informally. When they do, they do not just see their role in 
presenting and defending national positions but also, and often regardless of specific 
preference, in persuading others to reach an outcome. However, at the informal PSC-NAC 
meetings this does not arise because, under the agreed framework, no agreed actionable 
outcomes are permissible. As such, seeking consensus in the narrow sense is less relevant 
in this forum, and is reflected only in the preparation of the agenda and for scheduling 
future meetings. 
Once the agenda has been agreed, views are exchanged but no decisions can be 
taken. The purpose of these joint meetings is not merely for the PSC too update the NAC 
on how it views a particular issue or vice versa. The joint NAC-PSC meetings are also a 
platform for the member states to individually announce their preferences on a given issue 
and express how they see the two organisations best perform towards common interests. 
National delegations express their position as states, not as members of either the EU or 
NATO (Interview 10, 2016). What points in that direction is also that many ambassadors 
found hearing the views of non-common member states to be the most useful outcome of 
 	
these meetings (ibid.), although the general sense prevailed that the meetings were not as 
fruitful as they should be. 
It was also clear from the data that this forum was not the setting of choice for the 
“usual suspects” or others to protest their various grievances with respect to the political 
blockages that restrict further EU-NATO cooperation. For the most part, the ambassadors 
tend to be “on their best behaviour”, meaning that there are normally no “direct 
confrontations” (Interview 10, 2016). In short, they do not seek consensus on the key EU-
NATO blockages or sensitivities in these informal NAC-PSC meetings.  
The role of the ambassador – “the rhythm of work”27 
Consensus-seeking is not just a property of the general behaviour within the PSC and the 
NAC specifically, but is of course also a property of the role of the ambassador in general. 
In the interviews, most of our interlocutors referred to the abovementioned processes as 
part of their job of ambassador, and therefore, not as anything necessarily unusual. We 
found this aspect of the argument to serve as a useful variable in the exploration of 
decision-making mechanisms in these entities, and therefore derives a specific set of sub-
categories in this context: professionalism28, expertise29, freedom of manoeuvre30, and 
personality31. The following sections compare the PSC and the NAC along these sub-
categories and their impact on decision-making, before turning to an assessment of ‘the 
rhythm of work’ at the joint PSC-NAC meetings. 
The PSC and the NAC in comparison  
In both the NAC and the PSC working environment, professionalism is demonstrably seen 
as a key factor in the interlocutors’ working lives.  A strong sense of friendship was also 
discernible with “away days” being part of the job in both, the NAC and the PSC 
(Interview 10, 2016).  Most described an atmosphere whereby a level of “fundamental 
 	
respect and consideration” existed in both institutions (Interview 5, 2012). In both the PSC 
and the NAC, efficiency and completing functional tasks is the driving force behind 
consensus.  This is more often than not a basic determination to, in the PSC, get to 
conclusions before the COREPER ministerial at the end of the month, “so everybody will 
be happy”.  In the NAC, it is intended to close a dossier or a particular issue.  “Once a 
topic is tabled here in the NAC, it is concluded”. “Always, even if we can’t take a decision 
then you sense at all times the will of all to come to a conclusion.  […]  I can’t think of any 
dead files” (Interview 3, 2016). 
While there is a sense of professional collegiality and treating others with equal 
respect and consideration, one can infer from the data that there are important differences 
within their respective groups regarding the ability of specific ambassadors to guide 
discussions and negotiations. A sub-category that emerged from the data is the expertise 
conveyed by the ambassadors in each forum. One understanding of expertise relates to the 
specific national interests the ambassadors appear to represent. One particular reflection 
from a PSC ambassador illustrates how particular national priorities appear to stir 
particular diplomatic representatives into certain directions, which is often expressed in 
particularly well-founded positions: 
Austrians will always make the point of involving NGOs […] and people will listen, 
because [Austria] know[s] NGOs. […] Spain, Sweden, Finland will always bring 
forward the role of women in peace and security matters, and if they want something 
in, some may think [this is not crucial], but they will let them. They know their stuff 
[…] they will not come up with nonsense. So expertise matters (Interview 12, 2016). 
Besides the expertise based on states’ special interests, the data also conveys that expertise 
matters in the sense of experience and seniority of the ambassadors themselves. In many 
cases there is a “common understanding” between the capital and the delegation of the 
issue, “the national position, and a common understanding of the red lines” (Interview 5, 
 	
2012). If it becomes “serious”, then the ambassador […] has to go back to the capital. and 
this very much depends on the “personal weight and reputation of the ambassador” (Ibid).  
There are two types of ambassadors in the EU; only the junior ambassadors in the 
PSC deal with political-strategic issues and pol/mil issues. The senior level ambassadors 
reside at the COREPER and the Council level. In the PSC, ambassadors, on balance, tend 
to also be more junior vis-à-vis their NAC counterpart; although this can vary between 
member states (Interviews 2, 3, 5, 11: 2012-2016). Discussions with ambassadors who had 
experience working in both bodies were especially revealing. One PSC ambassador who 
had extensive previous experience as a NAC ambassador was particularly candid:  
You cannot really compare the two, they are completely different worlds. NAC 
ambassadors are the bosses, they are gods. […] Decisions in NATO are made by NAC 
ambassadors, with the instructions from governments of course. […] In the EU, even 
permanent representatives are small fry. The EU institutions, the bureaucrats believe 
they are the bosses (Interview 10, 2016).  
Due to this relative lack of decision-making autonomy and the particular position of the 
PSC within the organisational hierarchy of the EU, the role of the ambassadors there 
differs somewhat from that in the NAC. The PSC ambassadors do not just defend the 
interest of their own member state; they generally represent the intergovernmental 
dimension vis-à-vis the supranational institutions of the EU, meaning the Commission and 
the EEAS. In other words, the Member States (and the ambassadors) see the PSC as a 
“bulwark” against these other EU institutions (Interview 10, 2016).32 
Some senior NATO ambassadors are in a significantly better position than those in 
the PSC, and have the authority to go back to their national governments and directly ask 
for “changes” in the instructions from their ministry (Interview 5, 2012). They can even go 
beyond their mandate because they have the authority to negotiate, and therefore, some 
freedom to manoeuvre. For other nations, like Turkey for example, the actual leverage they 
 	
have in negotiations more often depends on the level of experience and relative authority 
of the chair (Interview 5, 2012). 
The sub-category of expertise, especially in the sense of experience is therefore 
closely linked to the sub-category of freedom of manoeuvre. In the case above, more senior 
and experienced ambassadors possess the necessary expertise to manoeuvre in negotiations 
both within the organization but also between the organization and their capital. However, 
expertise alone is not sufficient to determine the extent of such freedom. The freedom to 
manoeuvre is also determined by the member states’ administrative and diplomatic culture 
in the capital. For example, for the NAC French delegation, highly political issues need to 
be coordinated between their inter-agencies; the general staff, the Ministry of Defence, and 
the Élysée.33  Consequently, France’s more hierarchical and presidential system can often 
restrict the ambassador in either the NAC or at committee level (Interview 5, 2012). The 
UK ambassador on the other hand has more freedom to manoeuvre, to act and negotiate, 
due to the UK’s integrated approach, which brings both foreign and defence ministries into 
their delegation (ibid). The smaller nations follow their instructions more tightly and are 
often not able to make substantial decisions (Interview 5, 2012). 
Finally, the freedom of manoeuvre is tightly connected to the sub-category of 
personality, which correlates positively with the sub-categories of expertise and freedom of 
manoeuvre, but can sometimes inversely correlate with “professionalism”. Ambassadors’ 
freedom of manoeuvre requires both expertise and likeability, as one interviewee explains: 
“Personality has a great impact. You can obviously see whose positions are promoted more 
successfully because those ambassadors are more likeable” (Interview 11, 2016).  
However, a strong combination of such properties in an ambassador may have 
adverse effects on the professional aspect of the decision-making process. Within the PSC, 
for example, during the formal meetings, ambassadors are allocated three minutes for their 
 	
interventions. “The three-minute rule is for both equality and efficiency, but some 
personalities break the rule and talk for more minutes” (Interview 11, 2016). One 
particularly candid interlocutor pointed out that some ambassadors have “big egos and they 
cause more problems than they are being asked to by their capital”, but later added that this 
“is rare and everyone is on good terms” (Interview 2, 2012). 
PSC-NAC meetings 
The data suggested that joint NAC-PSC meetings were “amicable” (Interview 9, 2016). As 
there are 22 common member states, this is not necessarily surprising. However, 
professionalism extends to the non-common member states as well.  Interestingly, 
collegiality between Turkish and Cypriot colleagues was discernible through discussions 
with the relevant officials (Interview 1, 2012). Expertise plays a part through the various 
diplomatic ways in which ambassadors state their positions, i.e. without engaging in direct 
confrontation. A nuanced and perceptive awareness of such sensitivities by ambassadors is 
essential in these informal NAC-PSC meetings. 
That said, besides maintaining collegiality in the meeting, personality does not 
seem to play as big a role as is the case with meetings of the PSC and the NAC 
respectively, since interventions are “voluntary” (Interview 10, 2016) and “scripted” 
(Interview 9, 2016). In the specific case of informal PSC-NAC meetings, any freedom of 
manoeuvre only manifests itself in the possibility for ambassadors to discuss issues that are 
not on the previously agreed agenda. “If they want to make a point they do” (Interview 10, 
2016). Moreover, because these meetings are rare events and the two committees do not 
have much of “an institutional relationship”, there is not a lot of opportunity (or desire) for 
ambassadors to develop further expertise in this context (Interview 7, 2016). 
In sum, the data suggests that the main purpose of these joint meetings is to 
“establish a pattern of normality”. The meetings aim to convey an increase in EU-NATO 
 	
cooperation more broadly, while not introducing controversy into the milieu that might 
further stir political divides (Interview 9, 2016). In this context, attaining a consensus as 
such is less relevant, which particularly marginalises the role of agency through the 
ambassadors. Any remaining agency available to ambassadors is solely defined by the sub-
categories professionalism and expertise. Any agency stemming from ambassadors’ 
freedom of manoeuvre and personality is restricted by the highly scripted nature of the 
meetings. One possible exception can be found in the form of interjections that deviate 
from the agreed agenda at informal meetings. Considering that agreeing an agenda is seen 
as controversial, avoiding such controversy requires the aforementioned expertise and to 
some extent personality as well. 
Conclusions 
When generation of theory is the aim, however, one is constantly alert to emergent 
perspectives, what will change and help develop the theory. These perspectives can 
easily occur on the final day of study or when the manuscript is reviewed in page 
proof: so the published word is not the final one, but only a pause in the never-ending 
process of generating theory (Glaser and Strauss: 1967, p. 40). 
We set out to shed light onto the decision-making in the NAC and the PSC, and the inter-
organisational practices that emerge from the views of ambassadors involved in joint 
NAC-PSC meetings. To our knowledge, data collection on these meetings has never been 
undertaken, at least not with regard to the minutia of process and dynamic of both formal 
and informal NAC-PSC meetings. We realise that given the inherently small size of the 
sample, and the general limitations of any investigation in the area of security and defence, 
any tentative hypothesising is potentially premature. That said, we feel that our initial 
findings go some way towards both the wider objective of this special issue to further 
develop the EU-NATO research agenda, and more specifically, towards filling a gap in the 
 	
literature that contributes to a deeper understanding of the subtleties and deficiencies in 
joint decision-making between the NAC and the PSC. Induction helps generate probable 
“truths”, which proves to be a fruitful exercise in an issue area that is notoriously 
understudied. We argue that the openness and potential of inductive reasoning clearly 
outweighs any deficiencies in the approach. 
Overall, we infer a higher degree of structural influence and some impact of agency on 
decision-making within the PSC and the NAC, as well as at their less frequent joint 
meetings. Structures are found in the established procedures that emerged from the data as 
well as in the engrained practices of driving consensus that our interlocutors outlined; any 
arguments relating to the role of the ambassador, in turn, point to the influence of agency, 
which we argue is largely inconsistent, depending on the political and institutional 
circumstances.  
The categories that emerged from the data encompass more particular sub-categories. 
“Established procedures” include: frequency of meetings, preparation of the agenda and 
consensus rule. The consensus rule is identified as the most rigid structure, as none of our 
interlocutors expect it to change. As such, the consensus rule conditions a high frequency 
of meetings and intricate preparation procedures of the agenda and discussion points.  
While this may be the case at the respective NAC and PSC settings, at the joint PSC-NAC 
meetings, no real consensus is needed and the objective of these meetings is “just to have 
them”. Consequently, the frequency of these meetings is limited. However, individually 
established agenda preparation procedures still feature in the common meetings.  
The category “driving consensus” encompasses organisational design, informality 
and socialising. Both the PSC and the NAC are, by design, expected to reach consensus in 
preparation of the ministerial meetings. The organisational design encourages informality 
and informality in turn encourages socialising. In the joint setting, by design, the agreed 
 	
framework is not to formally take any decisions which can be operationalised. For this 
reason, the only real driver of consensus is establishing the agenda itself. Considering the 
agenda is predominantly set by the individual secretariats, any socialising or informality 
intended to drive consensus is marginal for joint meetings.		
The two structural categories (“established procedures” and “driving consensus”) 
are tightly connected to the predominantly agency focused category of “the role of 
ambassadors”. This category covers professionalism, expertise, freedom of manoeuvre and 
the personality of ambassadors. Apart from the structural nature of professionalism (which 
sets professional boundaries for ambassadors’ actions), these sub-categories are focusing 
on the agency of ambassadors. The correlations that emerge from the comparison between 
the PSC and the NAC suggest that the freedom of manoeuvre is enhanced with a higher 
level of expertise and agreeable personality. Personality is however still limited within the 
confines of professionalism. In the joint setting, these correlations are slightly altered. 
Professionalism still plays a role but any agency stemming from ambassadors’ freedom of 
manoeuvre and personality is restricted by the highly scripted nature of the meetings.  
These correlations offer insights into the workings of the PSC, the NAC and their 
joint meetings, but do not advance a finalised theory of decision-making in international 
security organisations. For that, further refinement of analysis, data collection and theory 
building would be required. However, the existing findings and categories that have 
emerged from this study are encouraging and demonstrate the usefulness of an inductive 
GT approach. Studying decision-making in the PSC and the NAC using a GT approach is 
particularly useful for understanding the established procedures, consensus building and 
the role of the ambassadors at the joint meetings for which existing theories are yet to be 
developed. In turn, this approach can be used to understand both the facilitating and 
constricting processes of the decision-making environment in future EU-NATO 
 	
cooperation - and particularly so if the current political blockages were to be alleviated. 
This article does not profess to be revolutionary or ground-breaking. However, it does 
break ground by suggesting that a direct, inductive approach to a problem may yield 
similar results as a potentially overly sophisticated and studious deductive approach to 
studying complex decision-making processes within the context of international security 
organisations.	
Finally, to put our analysis into perspective in terms of any broader understanding 
of the three bodies under investigation, the analogy of the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Ghost, although light-hearted, is somewhat useful for demonstrating how the ambassadors 
view their own institutions. The NAC (the father) has mapped out its territory quite well 
given its relative temporal maturity and commitment to established conventions. Our 
interlocutors spoke of a body whereby they believe “the scope of the conversation is more 
limited (compared to the PSC) but the quality and thoroughness is much higher” (Interview 
5, 2012). In contrast, ambassadors to the PSC (the son) believe their work to be novel and 
developing while also “more fun” due to the wider foreign policy instruments at their 
disposal (Interview 2, 2012). Finally, joint PSC-NAC meetings (the ghost) do manifest 
themselves occasionally but are understood to have no real tangible deliverables in terms 
of deepening formal EU-NATO cooperation. Considering that NATO and the EU are two 
of the most influential organisations for the provision of collective security, the three 
bodies under investigation should all shape the milieu of international security. The PSC 
and the NAC make actionable decisions for their own respective organisations whereas the 
joint meetings facilitate EU-NATO political and institutional cooperation through informal 
processes but without actionable joint decision-making. This article demonstrates how an 
inductive Grounded Theory approach can systematically generate insights into the key 
processes connected with these tasks.   
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Notes 
																																								 																				
1  22 of 28 member states of the EU are also NATO members, and most of the EU member states 
that do not have full membership of NATO (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) are part of 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Cyprus is the only EU member state that is not part of or 
associated with NATO in any way. 
2							As outlined in section 3. of the EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and 
Berlin Plus, ‘Such EU-NATO consultations involve the EU's Political and Security Committee 
and NATO's North Atlantic Council, the EU and NATO Military Committees as well as the 
Secretary General/High Representative and NATO Secretary General’. For full details, please 
see European Council. 2003. Background on EU-NATO permanent arrangements 
(Berlin +) 
	
3  Jørgensen (2004) reached a similar conclusion over a decade ago: “How different is 
intergovernmental cooperation in the CFSP from intergovernmental cooperation within NATO? 
Such a comparison, to my knowledge, has not been attempted by anyone. […] The absence of 
such comparative studies is unfortunate because we cannot reach general conclusions about 
intergovernmental cooperation or something about the specifics of each of the institutions 
mentioned” (p. 21). 
4  In the case of the NAC, this is an unspoken rule or “gentlemen’s agreement”; Article 10 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty does refer to “unanimous agreement” but only in connection to NATO 
enlargement. Voting procedures in the PSC fall under Article 23 of the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) which states that decisions “shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously” 
(Signatories to the Treaty of the European Union 1992 Title V, Article 23.1).  However, for 
some procedural matters as well as adopting joint actions and common positions, qualified 
majority voting is applicable with the exception of “decisions having military or defence 
implications” (ibid., Article 23.2). 
5  The labels for these conceptual categories were taken ad litteram from the interviews. 
	
 	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
6  Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
7  In 2000 an interim Political and Security Committee was set up by Council Decision 
2000/143/CFSP. 
8  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom 
9  Prior to the creation of the European External Action Service, the PSC agenda was “agreed by 
the rotating Presidency and the Council Secretariat” (Howorth 2007, p. 71). However, post-
Lisbon the PSC has had a Permanent Chairman. From 2010 to mid 2013, the former Swedish 
Representative to the PSC, Olof Skoog, held the job.  Since 2013, the role has been undertaken 
by Walter Stevens. 
10  While the majority of published research on the EU and NATO is either atheoretical or using a 
deductive approach, there have been attempts at “building bridges” through the use of 
abduction. Mérand (2012) used a combination of empirical observation, inductive theorising 
and hypothesis building, and a deductive comparison of Rational Choice and Historical 
Institutionalism to explain the emergence of the CSDP, effectively focusing more on the actual 
social practices found in the case than on theoretical premises about them. 
11  In the study of international security organisations, forms of data collection that involve direct 
participation or observation are not normally an option given the heightened levels of 
confidentiality. 
12  In this study, this translated into conducting several rounds of elite interviews. The 
interviewees can be the same or changed, and the approach allows for experimentation and 
	
 	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
variance in the targeted groups that are studied, which are “chosen in accordance with [the] 
emergent analytic framework.” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 53). 
13  Where GT inconveniently remains vague is the actual process of data analysis and writing of 
theory, which represents GT’s main limitation, as some critics duly point out (Allan 2003; 
Kelle 2005). Inductive inference still relies on intuition or what Glaser and Strauss refer to as 
“theoretical sensitivity” (ibid., p. 46). 
14  Given the reliance of inductive reasoning on probability, we are aware that conclusions should 
draw on a dataset as large as possible. However, due to the fixed size of membership within the 
organisations under investigation, the sample size was limited to 28 and 28 ambassadors.  The 
data collection consisted of a total of four rounds of interviewing with NAC and PSC 
ambassadors as well as deputies within the permanent representations. The first three rounds 
were conducted within a relatively short time frame and were therefore treated as one round in 
the analysis. All direct quotations in the following empirical sections were attained from 
transcripts; they are numbered throughout to allow replication. Beyond this information, no 
details of our interlocutors can be disclosed due to confidentiality. 
15  In the case of the NAC, the ambassadorial formation is the one meeting most frequently, which 
alongside with the direct comparability this ensures, was the main reason for targeting it in our 
data collection. 
16  In line with GT, the labels for each category were set in vivo, meaning that they were drawn 
from recurring phrases and expressions used by the interlocutors. 
17  “[The meetings] very much depend on the issue and the established procedures” (Interview 5, 
2012). 
18  The same respondent suggested that the reduction in NAC meetings was due to pressure by 
then Sec/Gen Rasmussen, who thought there were to “too many” (Interview 2, 2012).  This did 
not emerge from other interviews but there was a more subtle suggestion that the PSC and the 
NAC were going into opposite directions.  This may also be connected to the difference in size 
and scope of the PSC agenda (see below) compared to that of the NAC. 
	
 	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
19  At the NAC, informal consultation among national representatives is internally understood as 
the “lifeline of the Alliance” (Interview 13, 2016). 
20	 A 2016 NATO ‘Fact Sheet’ states ‘since 2003 the “Berlin Plus” arrangements provide the 
basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management in the context of EU-led operations that 
make use of NATO’s collective assets and capabilities, including command arrangements and 
assistance in operational planning. In effect, the “Berlin Plus” arrangements allow the Alliance 
to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged. According to Yost 
(2007, p. 12) “Operation Althea is the only on-going EU-led operation under ‘Berlin Plus,’ 
and it alone can be considered in a formal NATO-EU format. Aside from capability 
development issues, Althea is the only agreed agenda subject that can be discussed without the 
presence of Cyprus.” 
21    At the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit, the President of the European Council, the President of 
the European Commission and the NATO Secretary General signed a Joint Declaration ‘to 
give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership in light of 
common challenges’.  
22   “Consensus based and consensus driven that essentially influences to a large extent how things are 
negotiated; if you can be out voted than you start negotiating in a different way” (Interview 3, 2012) 
23  “The PSC was designed to reach consensus” (Interview 9, 2016). 
24 “We keep it informal here” (Interview 9, 2016); “Informally, there are receptions, dinners, 
working lunches […] so you meet your colleagues every day” (Interview 2, 2012). 
25  “New allies and new ambassadors […] integrate into the various social and political occasions 
and meetings” (Interview 5, 2012). 
26  From the data, we can infer the following: PSC Ambassadors seem to work under the 
assumption that their remit is more “fun” due to a wider ranging scope and the amount of 
foreign policy instruments at their disposal. Some PSC Ambassadors see the EU as the “wave 
of the future”, whereas NATO is an Alliance that has “mapped out its territory quite well” but 
	
 	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
is not really an “organisation in development” (Interview 2, 2012). However, NAC 
Ambassadors assume that although the scope of the conversation in the NAC is more limited 
than in the PSC, the quality and the depth is much higher. The interviews suggest that NAC 
ambassadors believe they believe the PSC is only “scratching the surface” whereas they are 
“going in depth” (Interview 5, 2012). 
27  “Scheduling of meetings and the rhythm of work is very well established.” (Interview 7, 2016) 
28  “I have never experienced when an Ambassador was shouting or losing his or her temper.  
They are professionals” (Interview 5, 2012). 
29  “Not all states have the expertise or a strong interest in all issues” (Interview 11, 2016). 
30  “This gives him a huge weight vis-à-vis his own administration and huge freedom of 
manoeuver” (Interview 5, 2012). 
31  “I think it is much more the personality of the individual” (Interview 7, 2016) 
32				For a discussion on supranational features of the PSC, see Howorth (2012) 
 
33  The official residence of the President of France. 
